Throughout the 1960s, NATO embraced détente as a political tool to enhance dialogue with Warsaw Pact countries. This, of course, demanded an absolute reliance on the nuclear capability of the United States and, with the slight exception of France and the United Kingdom, European Allies were more than content to live under the perceived security of the ‘Transatlantic Umbrella’. NATO settled into its “ New Look” policy throughout the 1950s, which aimed to give greater military effectiveness without having to spend more on defence. Allies were simply not prepared to meet the costs involved and, as the Alliance approached its third birthday, it was already learning that political ambition was one thing – putting boots on the ground was something else. Somewhat ironically, as a consequence of the Soviet Union’s nuclear build up following its detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1949, NATO’s policy of “Massive Retaliation” was also quoted as a reason why a build-up of conventional forces was not necessary. This led to the agreement of ambitious NATO force goals at the Lisbon meeting in 1952 but it soon became clear that these could not be met. This was Peace Dividend Number Two! To some extent, the Korean War reversed that thinking because of fears that Moscow would take advantage of the deployment of large numbers of forces on the Korean peninsula to launch an attack against Western Europe. The very establishment of the Alliance was such a strong reassurance measure that its member states were soon clamouring for further cuts to military forces, arguing that NATO provided such a strong political deterrent that a military presence in strength was not necessary. Effectively, this was Peace Dividend Number One, and Allied troop numbers in Europe dropped from around 4.5 million in May 1945 to less than one million by the end of 1946. Governments changed and had little interest in military spending – indeed, they were under considerable pressure from across the Atlantic to settle the debts that had arisen from the United States’ commitment to its European allies. In the post-Second World War years, Western European nations faced a political and economic dilemma. In fact, the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, preventing the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe, and encouraging European political integration. The Allies had no doubt about the threat to their national security and that it had to be matched by the necessary forces, which would persuade Moscow the Alliance was credible.īut is our memory entirely accurate? Contrary to common belief, it is also important to note that NATO, from its outset, did not have a single purpose. It had a singular strategic aim: to deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. It is said that, for 40 years, NATO successfully did what it was established to do.

Battle tank force field